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This professional report argues that current national security documents and the national 
security structure are not optimized to conduct hybrid and information warfare. It reviews an 
abundance of literature to first understand the United States national security strategy, coupled 
with the reemergence of great power competition. Four propositions emerged from the readings: 
national security publications are incoherent; a strategic paralysis has set in with the abundance of 
literature; there is a lack of organizational innovation; and the instruments of national power have 
tilted towards information. Following this review, the analysis then explores Russia’s great power 
competition strategy through private/public, legal/illegal, and regular/irregular lenses. China’s 
information warfare strategy, Three Warfares, which includes propaganda, public opinion, and 
legal warfare, provides the final piece of analysis on great power competition. This conflict is 
particularly vast—the hybrid approach calls on all elements of a nation's society; information is 
the dominant power shaping perceptions, decisions, opinions, and behaviors; and all this is 
conducted in the gray zone between peace and total war. The report then investigates the most 
recent declassified information warfare campaign against a great power, Operation QRHELPFUL, 
and a recent example of information leveraged as the main effort in a combined joint military 
operation. The United States can organize more effectively for the challenges it confronts by 
understanding the principles, lessons learned, and the context of great power competition. This 
requires vertical and horizontal organizational efforts, which include a shift in policy, a new 
organizational framework, assigning a lead, and adopting a whole-of-society approach. 
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Thirty years after the peaceful end of the Cold War, the United States is now entering a 
new era of great power competition. Emerging and resurgent great powers, Russia and China, 
stand as the primary national security threats to the United States, as defined in the 2017 National 
Security Strategy (NSS). The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), nested within the 2017 NSS, 
identified “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, as the primary concern for United States 
national security.”1 These threats from great powers are multi-domain; they exist across all 
elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. The 2018 NDS 
identifies revisionist powers and rogue regimes competing across the full spectrum of domains and 
capabilities: “they [great powers] have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding 
coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately 
blurring the lines between civil and military goals.”2 In particular, threats in the information 
environment have created a considerable strategic, operational, and tactical challenge for the 
United States to counter.3  This leaves the current international order ripe for disruption.   
Yet, despite these official acknowledgements of the threats facing the United States, the 
nation has done little to implement a strategy that would combat these threats, to orient its 
institutions towards blunting them, or to mobilizing the parts of society that are needed if the 
United States is to confront these challenges. As this work will argue, the reason for this lack of 
follow-through has do with the incoherence of strategic documents, the sheer number of 
conflicting analyses, and the lack of proper organization. 
 
1 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary, (The Department of Defense, 2018). Retrieved from 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 1.  
2 Ibid, 2. 




Since the dawn of the Information Age in the 1970s, the use of information as an instrument 
of national power has become more influential and effective in accomplishing national strategic 
objectives, as well as posing new dimensions of threats to the United States from its adversaries. 
In the words of the NSS, “America’s competitors weaponize information to attack the values and 
institutions that underpin free societies, while shielding themselves from outside information.”4 
Weaker nation-states and non-state actors, to a considerable degree, are also enabled by the 
democratization and distribution of information technologies. These technologies advance and are 
exploited at a speed and scale far greater today than at any time in history. Because of this, as Rory 
Cormac and Richard Aldrich argue, “Russia believes that a single global ‘information space’ is 
emerging, which could allow a country to exploit this space and alter the global balance of power.”5 
Russia, for example, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall has utilized advances in information 
technology to exploit vulnerabilities of the United States throughout the information environment, 
impacting both domestic and foreign interests. China’s information warfare strategy, known as 
Three Warfares, is a direct challenge to the United States’ global influence and directly shaping 
the geopolitical landscape. 6 
These threats are acknowledged at the highest level, but little has been done to adapt and 
counter them. The 2017 NSS acknowledges that “U.S. efforts to counter the exploitation of 
information by rivals has been tepid and fragmented.”7 In particular, there has been little 
organizational change to maintain the United States’ competitive advantage within the current 
 
4 Ibid, 34. 
5 Cormac, Rory and Richard Aldrich. Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible Deniability, 
(International Affairs, May 2018). Retrieved from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/3/477/4992414,  
  66. 
6 China’s Three Warfares, or information warfare, strategy includes three core concepts: public opinion warfare, 
psychological warfare and legal warfare. 
7 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 34.  
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international order. The Department of Defense (DoD) objectives in the NDS prioritized Russia 
and China as long-term strategic competition; however, in outlining the eleven stated objectives, 
none of them focused on hybrid or information warfare strategies. As Sean McFate articulated in 
a recent article for Medium Corporation: “In the future, victory will be won and lost in the 
information space, not on the physical battlefield. It’s absurd that the West has lost information 
superiority in modern war, given the heaps of talent in Hollywood, on Madison Avenue, and in 
London. The West’s squeamishness about using strategic subversion only helps its enemies.”8 To 
understand these threats and challenges, which seamlessly cross national borders, dominate 
geography, and impact the full spectrum of society, the response must start with organizing. 
The United States needs a new strategy and to operationalize information warfare to 
maintain its competitive advantage in the 21st-century. Instead of a whole-of-government 
approach, the United States must mobilize a whole-of-society effort and incorporate it at the 
operational and tactical levels, not just at the strategic level within the National Security Council. 
To counter closed-states and organizations, greater integration and collaboration across the 
government and private sector are required. In addition to decentralized operational authority to 
wield the national instruments of power at a scale and speed equal to United States adversaries. 
Furthermore, Special Operation Forces (SOF) are a unique element strategically positioned to 
carry out hybrid and information warfare campaigns. The United States must challenge traditional 
military thinking and operational frameworks and shift its attention to influence and shape the 
narrative. SOF can be a means to utilize against great powers and influence the narrative in support 
of United States national security objectives. The fundamental tenet to conduct information 
 
8 McFate, The Return of Mercenaries. 
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warfare is through a decentralized “whole-of-society” approach, in which US SOF is currently 
positioned to lead. 
The following sections will define hybrid warfare, information warfare and gray zone 
conflicts; highlight four propositions based on the literature review; and analyze Russia’s and 
China’s hybrid and information warfare strategies. These sections will frame the complex strategic 
environment that provides context for studying two cases where the United States has taken an 
active role in shaping the information environment. Lastly, the implications of this analysis, along 
with recommendations for an organizational design, will provide a framework that the United 






The research examined here focuses on the resurgence of great powers and their use of 
information to challenge the current international order through a whole-of-society approach. The 
principles and lessons learned that underline the use of information as a strategy, known as 
information warfare, were primarily identified through qualitative research coupled with empirical 
evidence through interviews and the use of collected data. It will review and provide a synopsis of 
great power hybrid and information warfare strategies, like Russia’s employment of General 
Gerasimov’s hybrid warfare strategy—often referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine.9 It will 
identify specific examples of Russia’s use of Spetsnaz forces, and how other entities of their 
society use subversive means to achieve Russian national strategic objectives. China’s Three 
Warfares was analyzed through open-source publications and other research articles and journals. 
This research is an aggregate of numerous articles, journals, official government documents, 
historical case studies, expert interviews, polling, and analysis, through the lens of personal 
experience. 
To understand the nuances of conflict in the 21st-century, several professors with expertise 
on Russia and hybrid warfare, former Central Intelligence Agency officers, and former members 
of the National Security Council were consulted. Interviews with retired senior military officers 
and three General Officers were conducted as well. These interviews included General Vincent 
Brooks, former Commanding General United States Forces Korea, United Nations Command, and 
Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command; Major General Ed Reeder, former 
Commanding General, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan / NATO Special 
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan; and Lieutenant General Jeffrey Buchanan, former 
 
9 The name “Gerasimov Doctrine” was given by scholars when General Gerasimov first published a thought piece 
on non-linear / hybrid warfare, but it should not be confused as actual Russian doctrine.  
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Commander, U.S. Army North (Fifth Army). These conversations focused on the strategic 
implications of hybrid and information warfare, examples of United States efforts in great power 
competition, and how the United States national security structure can organize to optimize a 
hybrid and information warfare strategy. In many ways, the challenges the United States faces are 
inherently a struggle between being effective and of upholding values. The baseline for any United 
States approach must first and foremost not compromise United States’ values—across all 
interviews, this was critical to the foundation of formulating a strategy for great power 
competition.  
The recently published book by Seth Jones, A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the 
Cold War Struggle in Poland was the primary source for the most recent unclassified information 
warfare operation against a great power. Jones provides a comprehensive review of Operation 
QRHELPFUL and several key factors associated with this Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led 
covert action program.10 His analysis of the strategic situation, the complex challenges, and the 
program design correlates similarly to what the United States faces today involving great powers.  
In the analysis of a recent United States information warfare example, polling data was 
used to shape the strategy. The data, about security issues in Yemen, came from a March 2017 
Yemen Polling Center for the European Union and a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
commissioned survey from May-August 2018. Both sets of data are thorough and consistent with 
traditional polling practices. The data collected is also unclassified; however, due to the nature of 
the collection and governing authority over the data it is not releasable at this time. Some of the 
data was selected to present an objective viewpoint, and to illustrate how an information warfare 
 
10 Many of the original classified documents and historical information regarding Operation QRHELPFUL reside in 
the National Archives, presidential libraries or were retrieved through personal interviews that were unattainable due 
to logistical constraints. 
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strategy shaped the environment and conditioned behaviors prior to the operation. Before moving 
further, it is important to get on the same page with defining a few key terms. Though the 
definitions of the following terms vary, by defining them here, it helps frame the understanding 
and argument in this paper. 
 
Hybrid and information warfare defined 
Hybrid warfare, information warfare, and gray zone conflict are not new terms. However, 
there are multiple articles and research journals that utilize these terms in abundance—drawing 
attention by describing the reemergence of great power competition and rising conflicts short of 
conventional war. These terms are extensively used throughout this paper and draw on key 
definitions and thoughts from subject matter experts.  
Hybrid warfare has been a Western military term for decades. It was also not foreign to 
James Mattis—an  American Lieutenant General at the time and later President Trump’s Secretary 
of Defense—who wrote about it in when it appeared in a 2005 title he authored.11 For this research 
paper, hybrid warfare is defined based on an article in the Combating Terrorism Exchange (CTX) 
Special Issue on Countering Hybrid Warfare. In CTX, Frank Steder, at the Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment, writes an article on the theory and history of hybrid warfare. He defines 
hybrid warfare as the “use [of] all means necessary—conventional and non-conventional, legal 
and illegal, regular and irregular—to weaken an adversary across time, level and place before war 
is declared.” Furthermore, according to Frank Hoffman, retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel 
and author of Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, states hybrid warfare’s chief 
characteristics are convergence and combinations. He describes these characteristics as “various 
 
11 Kramer, A. Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War, (The New York Times, March 
2, 2019). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/europe/russia-hybrid-war-gerasimov.html.  
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methods and actions, spanning all sectors of society, are combined and deployed simultaneously 
to present the opponent with a complex and overwhelming situation.”12 Hoffman highlights how 
warfare is converging within and combining, not just a whole-of-government but a whole-of-
society, to shape the geopolitical arena.  
The definition of information warfare remains highly debated. In fact, the United States 
currently has no official definition. Information warfare is one sub-category of hybrid warfare, 
albeit a significant one. Some research suggests information warfare is the range of kinetic and 
non-kinetic operations to protect and exploit the information environment, consisting of both 
defensive and offensive measures. Conrad Crane, a retired Army officer and historian, is clear and 
concise in his description of information warfare. Defining it as the “gathering, providing, and 
denying information in order to improve one’s own decision-making while damaging the 
enemy’s.”13 Scott Johnson from the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, shares a similar 
sentiment as Crane, but provides a more comprehensive description of information warfare in his 
article, Toward a Functional Model of Information Warfare. For this research paper, Johnson 
definition of information warfare—which focuses on the decision-making aspect of an 
adversary—will be used: 
“The ultimate target of information warfare is the way in which information 
is used—that is, the decision process. The desired effects of information 
warfare attacks may be indirect—not just blinding or confusing the enemy, 
but shaping his perceptions, decisions, opinions, or behavior. The 
 
12 Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 
December 2007). Retrieved from 
https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf, 9. 
13 Crane, Conrad. The U.S. Needs and Information Warfare Command: A Historical Examination, (Information 




information warfare planner's understanding of the target has to extend to this 
layer, and knowledge of the adversary has to include his decision criteria, 
decision processes and time scales, and vulnerabilities.”14 
Where in the spectrum of conflict does this take place? General Joseph Votel, former 
Commanding General U.S. Central Command, offered valuable insight of gray zone conflicts and 
characterized them “by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more 
fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war.”15 Thus, when 
these definitions are coupled together, the reemergence of great power competition can be framed 
in the space between peace and total war, utilizing a hybrid warfare strategy to incorporate all 
societal elements of national power, and leveraging the information environment to shape the 
decisions of the adversary. Understanding the context of great power competition through these 
definitions is fundamental for the argument imposed in this paper. The following propositions 
identify strengths and weaknesses of the literature reviewed at large.  
 
Proposition 1: National security publications are incoherent 
Research reviewed official government documentation focused on the 2017 NSS and 
respective Priority Actions sections to understand how the United States was thinking about the 
current fight and the overarching strategy to address hybrid and information warfare threats. The 
2017 NSS, the 2018 NDS, as well as the fiscal year 2020 resourcing strategy for the 2018 NDS, 
spoke of the reemergence of great power competition from Russia and China as top national 
 
14 Johnson, Scott. Toward a Functional Model of Information Warfare, (Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 
14, 2007). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/97unclass/warfare.html.  
15 Votel, Joseph , Charles Cleveland, Charles Connett and Will Irwin. Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone, 




security threats. However, these documents were ineffective capturing the threat from Russia and 
China's information warfare strategies that are disrupting the current international order and the 
global influence of the United States.  
 These strategic documents also failed to address organizational strategies. Therefore, 
additional research focused on former and current organizations who were and are tasked to 
execute hybrid and information warfare activities. These included the Central Intelligence Agency, 
United States Information Agency (USIA), and the DoD. The USIA, however, was disbanded in 
1999, and there was a lack of metrics and details associated with how successful they were 
throughout the Cold War executing information operations (IO). There is a full spectrum of United 
States military publications on the subject to include: the Joint Publications on Information 
Operations, the Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), and 
numerous other research journals and opinion articles, both foreign and domestic. The JC-HAMO 
provided the most comprehensive and inclusive design for the art and intent of information 
warfare—the need to understand relevant actors’ motivations and the underpinnings of their will.16 
The concept recognizes that war is fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor, and, thus, 
captures the necessity of incorporating the human aspect of warfare when shaping the United 
States national security strategy. However, the JC-HAMO was published in October of 2016, and 
it appears it has not been fully incorporated into operational planning. With so much information, 









Proposition 2: The abundance of literature creates strategic paralysis 
There is much to admire about the attempt to understand the resurgence of great power 
competition. Hybrid warfare, information warfare, political warfare, non-linear warfare, are 
current buzz words in academia, think tanks, and within the Washington beltway. However, in the 
last decade and to an increasing scale; national security meetings, think tanks, academic 
conferences, research journals, and published books on 21st-century warfare have occurred more 
and more often to the point of strategic decision paralysis. Numerous articles discuss what and 
how the United States might go about conducting or countering hybrid and information warfare, 
but little has changed internally to the DoD, Department of State (DoS), or any other governmental 
agency to operationalize hybrid and information warfare. Few have answered how the United 
States should organize to conduct or counter adversaries in the segment of the conflict continuum 
known as the gray zone. Thus, there lacks a comprehensive organizational approach to counter 
and conduct hybrid and information warfare.  
 
Proposition 3: Ineffective organizational structure for great power competition  
The United States has vulnerabilities in its current organizational structure to counter and 
execute hybrid warfare capabilities. This is illustrated in the insufficient changes in the United 
States national security organizational structure, a lack of authorities, as well as a lack of 
appropriate resourcing in the U.S. National Defense Budget. The 2018 NDS calls for difficult 
choices to “field a lethal, resilient and rapidly adapting Joint Force,” however reviewing the fiscal 
year 2020 resourcing strategy for the 2018 NDS highlights otherwise.17 
 
17 2018 National Defense Strategy Summary, 3.  
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To understand the reality of priorities, follow the money. The DoD Comptroller, David L. 
Norquist, testified before Congress on the fiscal year 2020 “strategy-driven budget” in support of 
the 2018 NDS.18 Though the DoD budget for fiscal year 2020 focused on the development of 
conventional military capabilities in the traditional realms of conflict, it lacked resourcing support 
for a hybrid or information warfare capability. Norquist said, “if you want peace, our adversaries 
need to know there’s no path to victory through fighting us.”19 Adversaries of the United States 
likely do understand this, and it is why they have tilted their strategies towards hybrid warfare and 
the asymmetric advantages it offers them in the information environment. The United States must 
address the hybrid aspect in which great powers are contesting its influence across the globe, as 
well as domestically, as seen in more recent years with the meddling in the 2016 Presidential 
elections.  
There were also numerous academic journals like the Combating Terrorism Exchange, 
Norway’s Special Operations Forces 2025 research paper, and others that provided examples on 
who, what, and how to counter these threats. However, they relied too heavily on the current 
military structure, which extends back to Napoleon’s era of combined arms, and not enough on 
how integrated society has become that requires a more effective whole-of-society approach. Even 
the intelligence community efforts and proactive policy options should call for the needed changes 





18 Vergun, David. DOD Comptroller: Overmatch Against China, Russia Critical, (U.S. Department of Defense, 





Proposition 4: The instruments of national power tilt towards information warfare 
Great powers have changed their strategies and organizational entities to be more effective 
in hybrid and information warfare. As the NSS states, United States “rivals compete across 
political, economic, and military arenas, and use technology and information to accelerate these 
contests in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor.”20 The effective use of 
diplomacy, military, and economic instruments of national power have been utilized to a far greater 
scale than information—the latter, however, has become far more influential in recent decades. 
Traditionally, we see the United States departments who embody these national powers, like the 
DoD, DoS and Department of Treasury, converge within the interagency process of the National 
Security Council. However, this whole-of-government approach is wielded only at the strategic 
level of government, which is cumbersome and slow to counter any threats. 
The 2017 NSS also describes the United States adversaries adapting and operating “below 
the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of international law.”21  United States 
policy-makers look at the world through a black and white lens, formulate policies and utilizing 
the instruments of national power to maintain this framework of international order.22 However, 
gray is the new black when it comes to shifting the global balance of power. In The New Rules of 
Warfare, Sean McFate states: “wars will move further into the shadows. In the information age, 
anonymity is the weapon of choice...Conventional military forces will be replaced by masked ones 
that offer plausible deniability, and non-kinetic weapons, like deception and influence, will prove 
decisive. Shadow war is attractive to anyone who wants to wage war without consequences, and 
 
20 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 25. 
21 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 27.  
22 Interviews with retired senior military officers. 
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that’s everyone. That is why it will grow.”23 This paper will provide greater specificity by 
analyzing both Russia and China as the primary great power threats executing hybrid and 
information warfare in the gray zone. It is essential to understand what they are doing, so that the 
United States not only recognizes and counters it, but also learns from it.   
 
23 McFate, S., The Return of Mercenaries, Non-State Conflict, and More Predictions for the Future of Warfare. (Go 




Great Power Analysis 
Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking 
Russia has invested in utilizing all aspects available within society, federal or private, legal 
or illegal, to conduct hybrid warfare. Their most well-known cases span over a decade from the 
2007 cyber-attacks in Estonia, the 2008 intrusion in Georgia, the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, and 
their more recent efforts in Syria. In the NATO Research Paper, Russia’s Renewed Military 
Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control States, the author Can Kasapogulu argues 
“the right panacea would not be centered on the question of ‘how to confront the Russian hybrid 
warfare challenge;’ rather, the question of ‘how to best understand the Russian hybrid warfare 
challenge.”24 The focus of this section is to evaluate previous research and how Russia incorporates 
SOF and alternative elements of society to shape the geopolitical arena to gain political power.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a wave of privatization expanded across 
Russia’s landscape. It acted as a catalyst for Russia to reinvent its national security strategy through 
the privatization of warfare—leveraging to a large extent private military companies and illicit 
networks that grew much out of the rise of the Vory.25 Russia employs sophisticated political, 
economic, and military campaigns that combine discrete actions, and they harness the information 
environment to shape perceptions, opinions, and ultimately decisions. Russia is patient and content 
to accrue strategic gains over time—making it harder for the United States and Western allies to 
respond. Such actions are calculated to achieve maximum effect without provoking a direct 
military response from the United States or NATO, as Article 5 stipulates. Furthermore, as the 
United States information warfare efforts dissolved, Russia invested and expanded theirs. They 
 
24 Kasapoglu, Can. Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control, (NATO 
Defense College Rome, November 2015). Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195099/rp_121.pdf , 11. 




did this through centralized control of television stations, shifting to a position of subversive 
control over Russian news outlets, and utilized social media bots and trolls and other emerging 
forms of communication to take a competitive advantage in the information environment. As these 
incremental gains were realized, over time, a new status quo emerged.26 
Russia developed a near-abroad strategy to project power and influence outside its 
borders.27 General Gerasimov, current Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, 
argued that “the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, 
and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”28  
In essence, he is describing what the United States has articulated in a whole-of-government 
approach to national strategic objectives—leveraging similar non-kinetic means in diplomatic, 
information and economic instruments of national power. Russia has extended its hybrid approach 
to encompass not just a whole-of-government but a whole-of-society. In which General 
Gerasimov’s thought piece published in The Military-Industrial Courier—that some refer to as the 
Gerasimov Doctrine—expounds on. The basis of it incorporates the use of active measures, both 
overt and covert, across multiple domains. Russia then shapes and performs behavioral 
conditioning of a target population before commencing operations to accomplish their objectives.29   
Russia has expanded the traditional roles and mission of SOF more so than the West. Dr. 
Spencer Meredith of the National Defense University gave a brief on Countering Russian Strategic 
 
26 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 28. 
27 Steder, Frank. Introduction, The Theory, History and Current State of Hybrid Warfare, (Combating Terrorism 
Exchange, November 2016). Retrieved from https://globalecco.org/documents/327413/327631/Vol+6+No+4.pdf/, 
12. 
28 Bartles, Charles. Getting Gerasimov Right, (Military Review, January-February 2016). Retrieved from 
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/194973.  
29 Kramer. Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War. 
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Approaches: Special Operations in Hybrid Warfare that captured Russia’s Special Operations 
capabilities, which reflect a comprehensive hybrid warfare strategy using diverse entities: 
• Spetsnaz – direct action/reconnaissance, becoming more unconventional warfare capable 
• Private Military Companies – technically illegal, but vagary gives plausible deniability 
and an outlet for intra-elite politics 
• Non-state actors – most effective within democratic systems and are integrated with 
information operations and cyber 
• Violent Extremist Organization proxies, puppets, partners – expand the strategic game and 
raise costs to the United States 
• Competition regarding regional military commands and GRU (Russia’s main intelligence 
directorate) control 
• “SOF” support – limited capabilities but expanding30 
To broaden the effectiveness of their hybrid warfare approach, Russia blends standard overt 
signatures of Spetsnaz conducting traditional special operations, along with private military 
companies, illegal networks, and cyber capabilities. Dr. Kiril Avramov, professor at the University 
of Texas at Austin, describes the modern Russian soldier as one who operates in the gray zone 
being between a serviceman, mercenary, or spook.31 A great example of this is Russia’s ISIS 
Hunters in Syria. This unit provides Russia the ability to conduct military operations without 
overtly placing Russian troops in contested areas that could potentially escalate the conflict 
between great powers. 32 
 
30 Meredith, Dr. Spencer. Countering Russian Strategic Approaches: Special Operations in Hybrd Warfare, 
(National Defense University, June 2019). Retrieved from https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/Countering-Russian-Strategic-Approaches-SMA-JUN-2019-SBM-converted.pdf, 8.  
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Russia’s use of non-state actors, such as the Russian Wagner Group, creates an ambiguous 
hybrid of privatized, yet, state-driven foreign policy.33 To complicate matters further, Russia’s 
execution of information operations and cyber-attacks through private companies like Sofacy, Tsar 
Team, and Sandworm, provide Russia the ability to fluidly impact elements in the near-abroad 
without confrontation from other state actors.34 In Syria, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Russia uses private military companies to carry out Russian foreign interests while 
providing the Kremlin plausible deniability. Exporting this hybrid model should not be taken 
lightly, it is blurring the lines and contesting international law in ways that pose a significant 
challenge for states to respond appropriately and in concert with the treaties and laws established 
in the current international system.  
Illegal activities and their associated networks are an asymmetric advantage Russia exploits 
to advance their near abroad strategy. Mark Galeotti, renown Russian expert, describes how 
Russian “businesses and politicians alike use many methods that owe more to the vorovskoi mir 
than legal practice.”35 In Galeotti’s book, The Vory, he captures just “how far the values and 
practices of the Vory have come to shape modern Russia.”36 Unlike the United States’ adherence 
to the rule of law, Russia’s exploitation of current norms and the use of alternative networks (e.g. 
illicit) provides them maneuverability, around sanctions for example, and freedom of action. In 
many ways, this is most effective against open and free societies because they run counter to the 
United States and Western values. Russia’s operations in transnational organized crime is another 
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opportunity for them to wage hybrid warfare against the current world order. The criminal state of 
their influence focuses on public corruption. Counterfeit and contraband to include drugs, humans, 
weapons, and timber, for example, has increased considerably with globalization to a level that 
surpasses the threat from international terrorism.37 These illicit organizations work in regular 
markets while utilizing the established logistics and nodes also to run illicit activities. In the case 
of Russia, it allows for the state to leverage these companies for state-sponsored illicit activities, 
circumventing sanctions imposed by the United States. However, the real concern is how these 
illicit networks also infiltrate public positions, businesses, and security offices in other countries, 
which over time, has the potential to reconfigure the nature of the state political and economic 
system, as in Moldova. 
Like the West, Russia’s covert action is based on the principle of plausible deniability. 
However, in more recent years, Russia has reshaped efforts in the gray zone towards a strategy of 
implausible deniability. Though the intent of covert action is the ability to deny knowledge of or 
the responsibility of an event, taking on an implausible deniability position creates further 
ambiguity in international affairs. Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich define in Grey is the New 
Black, implausible deniability as “open secrecy”—unacknowledged interference in the affairs of 
others.38 In the age of fake news and misinformation, this can be a considerable advantage. Cormac 
and Aldrich list two essential concepts regarding implausible deniability. “First, implausible 
deniability opens a gap in the decision-making of cumbersome institutions like NATO that Russia 
can exploit. Second, ambiguity and implausible deniability allow the construction of powerful 
narratives. Knowledge of Russian activity—without acknowledgement—allows the Kremlin to 
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cultivate an image of omnipotence.”39 The ultimate result is to influence decision-making in a 
direction favorable—or at least not harmful—to the Kremlin.  
Russia tested and refined its hybrid warfare strategy throughout multiple conflict 
engagements. In 2008 Russia reemerged in a hybrid warfare obtrusion into Georgia. The lessons 
they learned there were refined and employed once again in Ukraine, where they carried out more 
direct combat support roles and orchestrated implausible deniability actions in Crimea. Russia 
perfected this strategy in Syria to the point where they realized they could export it globally in a 
more organized way.40 General Gerasimov cited the Syrian civil war—a combination of an 
expeditionary force supported by information operations—provided the lessons to expand Russian 
national interests beyond its borders.41  
Russia has since exported its hybrid warfare strategy across Africa and South America. In 
one case, Russia employed Spetsnaz forces across the beach of Libya in support of Khalifa Haftar, 
leader of the Libyan National Army. Along with strategic messaging in support of Haftar, Russia 
provided security for him as well as strategic messaging.42 Though the United States openly 
supported the new Government of National Accord for Libya following the collapse of Muammar 
Gaddafi, there was continued debate within the United States government if this was the right 
political alignment. Until President Trump’s Tweet in 2019, does the United States position appear 
to shift in support of Haftar. A form of strategic messaging that could be confused with the 
underlying diplomatic view of whether the United States supports Haftar or the Government of 
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National Accord. This is just another example where Russia and the utilization of Spetsnaz have 
contested United States geopolitical influence in the information environment. 
In closing, the Soviet idea of hybrid and information warfare is more complex than Western 
equivalents. It offers a holistic approach, adopted and implemented by a variety of public and 
private, legal and illegal organizations. Covert methods and actors mutually support their overt 
counterparts, making them deliberately difficult to conceptualize and counter.43 Targeting the 
adversary’s decision-making is the ultimate objective—to obtain the freedom of action to expand 
their national interests—short of a conventional war. Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, in Russian 
Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine, argue Russia’s execution of full-spectrum 
conflict depends on centralized command and control that is highly coordinated.44 They conclude 
Russia’s comparative advantage is their ability to effectively target the European Union and 
NATO’s cumbersome decision-making process.45 Russia’s approach is complex and concerning. 
However, to understand the reemergence of greater power competition and how the United States 
can organize against it, is incomplete, without understanding a bit of China’s great power 
competition strategy.  
 
The Rise of Sun Tzu in China  
China’s strategy, falls too, under the umbrella of hybrid warfare—its ends, ways, and 
means remain similar with great power competition strategies. There has been a consistent blend 
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of conflict for decades they refer to as “peacetime-wartime integration.”46 China has been shaping 
the geopolitical landscape through informatized local wars—regional conflicts defined by real-
time, data-networked command and control and precision strike.47 Their modern framework, 
known as Three Warfares, was inspired by the underlying principles of Mao Zedong. Mao stated 
those favorable of the strictly military view:  
“Think that the task of the Red Army…is merely to fight. They do not 
understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the 
political tasks of the revolution. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake 
of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize 
them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power.”48  
The purpose of the Red Army was not necessarily to confront the enemy in direct combat, but 
rather to shape conditions favorable to the political end Mao envisioned. As Sun Tzu inspired, “the 
supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”49 Today we see similar sentiments 
under China’s information warfare strategy and it’s roll in the South China Sea—shaping views 
on Taiwan, the One Belt One Road initiative, and the latest SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. 
Chinese military writings over the past decade have centered on information warfare. They 
believe “achieving information superiority is seen as the precondition for achieving and 
maintaining battlefield supremacy,” as presented in Timothy Walton’s China’s Three Warfares 
article.50 They actively exploit information operations concepts as a means to direct influence on 
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the engagements and outcomes in areas of strategic competition.51 China has since formalized its 
strategy, known as Three Warfares, to gain political power through three main principles: 
psychological warfare, public opinion (media) warfare, and legal warfare.   
Psychological warfare intends to influence foreign decision-makers and how they approach 
their policies on China through the coordinated use of propaganda. China’s intent is to target 
critical nodes in foreign government decisions to achieve non-linear effects. Walton describes 
China’s thinking related to their adversaries, “the enemy’s motivation and willingness to wage war 
could be targeted, by eliminating opposing leadership, diminishing international support, 
undercutting military capabilities, affecting the economy, or sowing domestic political dissent.”52 
A retired senior military officer and current professor at the University of Texas at Austin recalled 
a conversation with Chinese business professionals who mentioned China spends a considerable 
amount of time and resources focused on United States decision making. China is sharply attuned 
to the core definition of information warfare. 
Public opinion, or media, warfare aims at shaping and influencing domestic and 
international public opinion through both overt and covert media manipulation. A vital component 
of this is China’s United Front Work Department. Peter Mattis, writes for War on the Rocks and 
in The Third Magic Weapon: Reforming China’s United Front, states the United Fronts’ purpose 
is to “rally social groups and individuals to support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its 
objectives.”53 Efforts are focused on the behavioral conditioning of the domestic population. The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely sends “significant media teams to cover the efforts and 
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inform the population of the PLA’s, People’s Armed Police’s, and militia’s work in non-traditional 
security missions.”54 Domestically focusing on the information environment allows China to 
influence local sentiment and develop favorable domestic support for both domestic and 
international strategic actions.  
Legal warfare, or “Lawfare,” seeks to shape the legal context and justification for Chinese 
foreign policy action.55 Nowhere is it better illustrated than in the South China Sea and the 
contested islands China is developing and claiming as sovereign territory. Additionally, we can 
see this strategy take place across China’s One Belt One Road initiative. China’s economic 
pursuits, bound by a legal framework, create enduring influence as shown in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
and elsewhere across the Eurasian landmass and littoral. It is practically written into the law for 
Chinese businesses to support the CCP. China’s National Security Law, enacted in 2015, states 
that its citizens and corporations have the “responsibility and obligation to national security.”56 To 
this point, the 2017 Chinese National Intelligence Law states Chinese companies must “support, 
assist, and cooperate with China’s intelligence-gathering authorities.”57 Though the law is vague, 
some experts and United States officials highlight that the Chinese telecommunication company, 
Huawei, for example, could be forced to help the CCP with intelligence gathering.58 Authorizing 
Huawei access to the telecommunication infrastructure for the United States and Western allies is 
contested. This is not to diminish its competitive advantage economically, but because it would 
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give them a critical point of leverage on the telecommunication infrastructure they could shut down 
at a moment’s notice, crippling the United States or any adversary.   
To be clear, we are not talking about doctrine, but rather the strategy China intends to 
utilize to gain a competitive advantage. This strategy is often related to the PLA, but Peter Mattis 
characterizes it as the overarching way in which the CCP approaches influence operations and 
active measures, just their normal way of doing business.59 Another way China implements this 
strategy is by identifying select foreign political, business, and military elites and organizations 
abroad relevant to China’s interests. In another Taiwan example, a local Taiwanese media 
described a high-level espionage case that involved a senior Taiwanese military officer in the 
Military Intelligence Bureau, who collected operational military intelligence for China.60 The U.S. 
Department of State 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices identified PRC officials 
who used the fourth Beijing-Taiwan Media Forum to shape Taiwan media outlets coverage in 
support of Chinese political priorities. China’s influencing of the domestic population could 
impose tensions with Taiwanese political leadership.61 Though, Taiwan is not the only one 
vulnerable to China, who has also attempted to recruit American spies through LinkedIn and other 
social media platforms.62 Ultimately, China tailors its network analysis to influence operations that 
may include conversion, exportation, or subversion.63  
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China’s information warfare strategy is carried out by multiple government agencies, but 
primarily the PLA. Unfortunately, there was little information on how China employs its SOF in 
support of its Three Warfares strategy. However, that is not to say they are not learning from 
Russia’s employment of SOF or even the United States to shape events. There should be no 
surprise if bread crumb trails of Chinese SOF appear in places like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
remote areas of Africa in the future. 
The most recent example of Chinese Three Warfares at play, across all concepts of 
propaganda, public opinion, and legal warfare, is the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Multiple narratives 
originated from China that had global implications. First and foremost is the lack of transparency 
and censorship that occurred during the outbreak. For example, “China’s leader, Xi Jinping, 
reportedly spoke on the issue before the Politburo Standing Committee on January 7, two weeks 
before he mentioned it publicly.”64 Another example of how China is shaping its public opinion is 
the narrative Chinese elite claimed, that the United States military brought the SARS-CoV-2 virus 
to China during the October 2019 Military Olympics in Wuhan.65 Though this is unlikely to gain 
any traction in the United States or with Western allies, it does play a factor in the perceptions of 
the people of China and more regional Asian nations. From a propaganda standpoint, China is 
doing everything they can to save face by nearly rewriting the history of the virus and grooming 
the elements of the language around it.66 Respectively, China has issued a new policy, in which all 
academic papers on SARS-CoV-2 require extra vetting before public dissemination—specifically, 
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studies on the origin of this virus must be approved by the CCP.67 The competing narratives that 
emerge, will impact policymakers and public opinions for years to come. 
Peter Mattis’ article, China’s Three Warfares in Perspective, describes China’s efforts as 
the way the “PLA decided to conceptualize the different tasks of shaping the environment in which 
the army operates.”68 This shaping of the operational environment through hybrid and information 
warfare strategies, that both Russia and China employ, in many ways, was learned by studying and 
mirroring the United States. In one case, Operation QRHELPFUL, is a historical example and the 
most recent declassified information warfare covert action to date that is evaluated in the following 
section. Then a more recent and empirical model will be discussed focusing on the principles of 
understanding and utilizing the information environment as the main effort in a combined joint 
military operation. The intent is to understand and identify general principles and lessons learned 
from former and more recent United States information operations that can be applied today to 
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Historical and Recent U.S. Information Warfare Examples 
Operation QRHELPFUL 
The United States during the Cold War conducted information warfare through entities like 
USIA, U.S. Agency for International Development, the DoD, DoS, and the CIA.69 It required a 
whole-of-government approach to counter the former Soviet Union. The most recent example, due 
to declassified government documents of a United States information warfare campaign against a 
great power, is Operation QRHELPFUL. Seth Jones’ uncovers the details of this operation in his 
book and shares his comments about Operation QRHELPFUL at an event sponsored by the 
Intelligence Studies Project held at the University of Texas at Austin in April 2019.  
In 1981, a surge of labor unrest in Poland created an opportunity behind the Iron Curtain 
for the CIA to execute an aggressive information warfare campaign. Lech Walesa, a charismatic 
union leader at the Gdansk shipyard, captured the support of nearly 10 million laborers to rise 
against industrial injustice and horrible living conditions in Poland—this trade union became 
Solidarity. After his election, President Ronald Reagan held multiple National Security Council 
meetings regarding the rising tensions in Poland between a pro-democracy labor movement and 
the communist regime. The CIA’s intelligence analysis stated, “Poland presents the USSR with 
the most threatening and complex challenge to its vital interests to emerge in the postwar period.”70 
The CIA predicted the Soviets would force the Polish regime to declare martial law in response to 
Solidarity. Security forces were expected to destroy property and haul Solidarity leaders to jail. 
This outraged President Reagan and led to a series of national security decision directives (NSDD) 
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centered on disrupting Soviet control in Eastern Europe – NSDD-32 and NSDD-54.71 President 
Reagan’s alignment with the intelligence community, political top cover, and aggressive stance to 
counter Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe were prominent in the centralized support and overall 
design of Operation QRHELPFUL.   
A covert action information warfare program, Operation QRHELPFUL, was initiated with 
a “presidential finding to provide money and non-lethal equipment to moderate Polish opposition 
groups through surrogate third parties, hiding the U.S. government’s hand.”72 Deniability was a 
key factor for Solidarity members as well as the United States government. The protest movement 
needed to be Polish-led and orchestrated to ensure authenticity and legitimacy to both domestic 
and international actors. There was also significant counterintelligence risk, the Soviet Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), or Committee for State Security, had extensive source 
networks in Poland looking to counter the West’s influence. Thus, the design of Operation 
QRHELPFUL was critical to ensure that any intervention by the United States was concealed. 
Working through third parties, establishing a surrogate network, and developing “ratlines” to 
funnel money and non-lethal equipment like radio antennas, was essential to support Solidarity. 
Additionally, advances in technology in the early 1980s enhanced the efforts of Solidarity—the 
CIA provided radio antennas that bypassed Soviet control of the radio spectrum. The cumulation 
of these efforts enabled Solidarity to print newspapers (e.g. Tygodnik Mazowsze, which means 
weekly of Mazovia, a region in central Poland), broadcast radio messages, and disseminate other 
propaganda materials to shape their narrative and build popular support.  
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After nearly eight years of shaping perceptions, opinions, and decisions, Operation 
QRHELPFUL efforts were realized in the 1989 Polish elections with approximately 75-80% in 
favor of the trade union’s candidates.73 It is difficult to ascertain how influential Operation 
QRHELPFUL was in countering the Soviets. The United States was simultaneously waging 
information warfare across Europe, supporting ideological values of democracy and freedom 
through entities like Radio Free Europe and other forums. However, Operation QRHELPFUL 
would have had a multiplying effect with other organizations like the National Endowment for 
Democracy and the Catholic Church, who aided Solidarity through coordination and gaining 
efficiencies across their respective areas of influence. Scholars may debate how important all of 
this was, but Solidarity winning the votes in Poland was critical to ending communist rule across 
Eastern Europe.  
Jones describes some of the main tenants of Operation QRHELPFUL were financial 
support, a technological component, and masking the United States involvement. This enabled 
Solidarity to gain legitimacy, print newspapers, broadcast radio programs, and conduct a wide 
range of information operations against the Soviet-backed government.74 Part of a successful 
information warfare effort then must include the highest levels of governmental support, resources 
or money, non-lethal equipment/aid, technological advancements, and deniability that creates 
authenticity and legitimacy for the narrative and cause.  
In the following section is a recent example where information, used as the main effort, 
conditioned the operational environment for a combined joint military operation in the Middle 
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East. Real-world polling data was utilized to conduct a psychographic analysis of the human 
terrain—tailoring tactical to strategic messaging to shape perceptions and condition behavior—
while working through a legitimate regional partner. This approach resembles Russia’s hybrid and 
information warfare operations in Georgia and then Crimea at the beginning of the 21st century—
testing this operational methodology, learning from it, and enhancing these capabilities to 
accomplish national strategic objectives. Due to the sensitivity of the area of operations, some of 
the unclassified information was modified. 
 
Information as the Main Effort 
What follows is an example of enabling regional partners who have a local affiliation to 
shape an appropriate narrative in support of counterterrorism operations. The 2017 NSS Priority 
Action to information statecraft requires activating local networks. It stated “local voices are most 
compelling and effective in ideological competitions. We [US] must amplify credible voices and 
partner with them to advance alternatives.”75 Messaging can be the United States’ most effective 
weapon, but broad messaging is largely ineffective and can be counterproductive if it activates the 
adversary’s networks.  
The operational design for this information warfare effort utilized a model where the main 
aim was more inclusive of understanding the operating environment. It incorporated the human 
domain and used information warfare characteristics to shape the decisions and behaviors of locals 
through similar components that made Operation QRHELPFUL successful support from 
leadership, resource assistance, incorporation of technology and data, and minimizing the United 
States signature. The objective was to set conditions with the local populace to establish a behavior 
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that divided hardcore extremists from potential supporters while favoring foreign military efforts 
in the region. The unofficial terminology utilized in this section to describe this approach is the 
Base/Enabler Methodology (B/EM). The intent was to shape both the base and enemy’s 
perceptions, decisions, opinions, and behavior.  
The B/EM can be softly defined as segmenting apart those who support peaceful civil 
society from those who support acts of violence. It provides an operational framework to clarify 
strategic messaging opportunities. The B/EM analysis requires thinking through the strategic goals 
of the engagement and weighing the impact of actions—kinetic, non-kinetic, and no-action—on 
the groups that will strengthen civil society and those who would overthrow it. Based on other 
operational experiences in South Asia, East Africa, North Africa, Latin America, and the Middle 
East, a correlation exists between indicator messaging and network activity on the ground. 
The following figures, tables, and data throughout this section illustrate findings from 
utilizing polling results on security issues in Yemen from a March 2017 Yemen Polling Center for 











All the preparatory work was focused on civil society and shaping the human domain, as 
condition setting is a critical component in an information warfare model. In this case, the 
methodology conducted a psychographic analysis and segmented the local population to create a 
tailored influence operation, as outlined in Figure 1. The intent was to shape local conditions to 
enable a follow-on SOF advise and assist mission. It required identifying friendly and enemy base 
and enablers, as well as those unengaged. This methodology provides an operational framework 
to influence and counterinfluence through identifying opportunities for strategic to tactical 
messaging aligned with the associated or desired impact.  









It is most useful to segment the population into operational “Friendly” and “Enemy 
Enabler” groupings. The goal of civil society engagement is to build friendly networks and 
suppress enemy enablers. In Yemen, that means finding supporters of peace and civil society 
norms from within both the Sunni and Zaydi populations and messaging—both directly and with 
indicator messaging—to reach them.76 In Yemen, we used the polling survey results to segment 
 






























the population into the following groups: Friendly Base, Friendly Enablers, Unengaged, Enemy 
Enablers, and Enemy Base. 
Table 1. Segments of Base/Enabler Methodology 
 
The purpose was to understand what statements were most effective to shape the narrative 
and who to target what statements towards. After analyzing the data in Table 2, it was shared with 
the lead regional partners—who were viewed as credible and could engage more effectively at the 
local level than United States forces to shape the information environment in support of future 
operations. 
 
Table 2. Segment characteristics  
 
Friendly Base: 
• Strongly opposed to violence 
• Opposed AQAP 
• Self-directed and engaged in society 
Friendly Enabler: 
• Mostly opposed to violence and 
AQAP 
• Somewhat engaged 
Unengaged: 
• Feel others control their lives 
Enemy Enabler: 
• Some support for violence 
• Some support for AQAP 
• Somewhat engaged 
Enemy Base: 
• Support AQAP or violence 
Friendly Base • Mostly men (72%), more empowered, feel strongly supported & cared about 
• Watch al Arabya TV 
• Pro-West  
Friendly 
Enablers 
• More Males (52%) 
• Financially strained 
• Highest Education Levels  
Enemy Base and 
Enablers 
• Many Unemployed, less educated  
• Younger, more likely to live with parents 
• Mixed on West; more likely to watch BBC 
Unengaged • Majority of this group is women 
Houthis • More likely to work full time 
• Most anti-US group 
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How to reach the targeted populations varied. The Yemenis gather multiple sources of 
information, from international satellite channels to neighborhood friends and family. Local 
television channels reflect the viewpoints of their host cities: Sunni and Shi’a, north and south. 
This fragmented media environment can make information gathering difficult, but it also allows 
discrete communications targeted geographically or demographically. The United States and its 
partners have active information operations in Yemen, as well as many attributable channels for 
communicating both inside Yemen and to the global media. Successful messaging is achievable if 
the relevant and acceptable message is delivered by a trusted messenger—as in the case with the 
Solidarity movement in Poland. Messages attributable to the United States, either directly or 
indirectly, are likely to be received poorly. Although many Yemenis have positive feelings about 
aspects of the West, and almost 70% would, for example, be happy to have their children study in 
the West—they are broadly opposed to the United States interference in the internal politics of 
Yemen. Seventy percent of Yemenis in the selected area say the United States role in Yemen 
internal affairs is negative. This compares to 83% with negative feelings towards Iran, and 39% 
negative towards the regional partner (with 46% positive towards regional partner). 
In the selected areas of Yemen, the most impactful telecommunication medium is 
television, with other sources of communication falling far behind. Overall, radio and newsprint 
are used by only small minorities. Television penetration is strong both through local channels and 
international channels. Facebook and other social media venues will reach only a small percent of 
the population. There is some variation among the segments in which channels or stations are 
accessed. With the Houthis, al Maseerah is most popular (45%), along with local channels. For the 
other segments, Friendly and Enemy, al Arabya is the most watched, followed by Aden TV, Suhile 
TV, and al Jazeera. Enemy Enablers were somewhat more likely to watch BBC than other 
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segments, but it is still a small group (6%). Survey respondents said they have the most confidence 
in their local imam, Red Crescent, local government, and police. They have the least confidence 
in the Houthis, AQAP, President Hadi, elections, and the tribal justice system. Tribal elders (45%), 
community leaders (32%), imams (12%), police and political leaders (4%) were said to be the most 
influential in the local community, based on a normalized scale.  
The most substantial concern of Yemenis is the war (31%), but enemy groups and Houthis 
each rate other issues as bigger concerns. For enemy groups, corruption is more important, and for 
Houthis rising prices and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) matter more than the war. 
On a personal and family level, the concerns are more prosaic; jobs, running water, and electricity 
top the concerns. Safety and security are further down the list. In addition to a dislike for Iranian 
and United States interference, there were also divided views about what the government should 
look like should peace come, as identified in Figure 2.  











Friendly Other Houthi 
Yemen should remain one country  
with a strong central govt  
Yemen should remain one country 
with strong provincial govt 
Yemen should be split into  














The majority supported a degree of regional autonomy, if not complete separation of North 
and South into two countries. As a result, the following messages were not likely to resonate with 
the audience segments: 
• We are fighting for a unified Yemen controlled by a strong central government. 
• We are fighting to restore the legitimate President Hadi government. 
• Yemen should have a secular rule of law where all people are treated equally regardless 
of religion. 
• The United States is proud to sponsor this program to help Yemen. 
• People need to reject AQAP and its violence. 
Delivery of these messages in a manner attributable to the United States can be 
counterproductive, motivate Enemy Enablers, and reinforce the messaging from AQAP and the 
Houthis. The following messages are more likely to be successful in support of the Friendly Base, 
as they address the concerns of Yemenis. 
• Iran and the Houthis cannot be allowed to dominate Yemen. 
• Yemen can prosper with strong regional governments after the war. 
• Ending the war will mean ending airstrikes, restoring the economy, and creating jobs. 
• Yemen can have a balance with the West, bringing benefits while stopping interference. 
• Success will bring a “peace dividend” as money will pour in for reconstruction. 
• Success will end the airstrikes and the war. 
Additionally, the below messages could suppress the Enemy Enablers and shrink the size 
of their networks. It is important to note, that for much of the Enemy segment, stopping Houthi 
and Iranian domination are persuasive motivators. Official government forces need to be 
convincingly better at repelling the Houthis than other Sunni groups. It is worth noting that the 
Enemy segment identifies corruption as a key concern as well. 
• We want to restore order and security as soon as possible. 
• A Republic of Yemen Government victory will defeat the Houthis and stop the airstrikes. 
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• A new government will fight corruption and funnel reconstruction funding into building 
water supplies, electricity to jump start jobs. 
• A peaceful Yemen will let local people and tribes oversee their own future. 
• Peace under the official government will connect Yemen to its proper place in the world. 
• Iran and the Houthis cannot be allowed to dominate Yemen—locking us into permanent 
conflict with our neighbors and destroying our future in the world. 
Once the operational environment is understood, then look to craft the message. Every 
message has three parts: the source, the message, and the audience—all three are essential. Even 
if good themes are developed, the attribution can be wrong or even broadcasted to the wrong 
segment. Additionally, United States attribution, whether intentional or not, often undermines the 
message, so it is imperative to have message discipline through credible local voices, just as stated 
in the 2017 NSS. Local voices should be natural leaders in the community, who can amplify themes 
that endorse or promote the strategic narrative or policy objectives. 
With this knowledge of the operational environment, the next phase is to implement the 
B/EM framework towards the desired objectives. In 2017, a strategic offensive in a southern 
Yemen province was led by the regional partner, alongside 2,000 local forces. The offensive 
resulted in pushing AQAP out of the province and into the nearby governorate. The regional 
partner's efforts to build a local security element was also critical to shaping the narrative, both 
strategically and tactically. Meanwhile, AQAP continued tactical and strategic messaging to shape 
their perception towards Enemy Enablers and others to find support for their decision to withdraw. 
This latter point is simply to illustrate the dynamic nature of using the information environment to 
shape perceptions. The following sections will discuss implications and recommendations to gain 
a competitive advantage with the information element of national power by harnessing a hybrid 





The 2018 NDS recognized the enduring strategic competition between the United States, 
Russia, and China requires a whole-of-government approach—diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic—referred to as DIME. Conflict in the 21st-century has escalated within the 
information environment. Diplomatic, military, and economic remain significant elements, but 
because United States adversaries are weaker in these areas, they have tilted their strategies to 
leverage the information environment through hybrid warfare. Russia’s use of private military 
companies have mirrored the United States model of employing Blackwater and other contractors 
throughout conflict areas.77 China’s observation of the Persian Gulf War—how the United States 
painted Iraq as an aggressor to build consensus and support from the international community, to 
include other Arab nations—shaped their information warfare strategy. This is precisely an area 
of geopolitical conflict that Russia and China have developed significant capabilities. 
Scott Johnson, of the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, argues that information 
warfare extends beyond the techniques and capabilities for traditional forms of information 
warfare.78 It has three parts to be effective: a set of information warfare elements (techniques and 
capabilities), a comprehensive strategy that applies and orchestrates them, and a target and 
objective.79 A useful definition or model of information warfare, therefore, has to describe the 
ultimate target and objective, and identify and list the applicable elements of information warfare.80 
The ultimate target for Operation QRHELPFUL was bolstering a pro-democratic movement to 
counter the Soviets by indirectly supporting Solidarity. This was done through financial and other 
 
77 Blackwater was the former name of a well known US private military company, but it’s name has since changed 
to Academi due to a public image mishap in Iraq in 2007. 





non-lethal assistance to enable Solidarity’s efforts through surrogates and ratlines across Europe. 
US SOF, along with interagency support to the regional partner prior to the combined joint military 
operation, is representative of the testing and evaluating of an operational design the Russian’s 
pioneered in Georgia and Crimea—shaping perceptions, decisions, opinions, or the behavior of 
the friendly and enemy base and enablers. Unique psychographic analysis was conducted while 
leveraging information technologies to disseminate targeted messages. Much of the operation was 
possible because, like Solidarity in Poland, the regional partners provided an authentic and 
legitimate voice. The lessons learned in Yemen can be more broadly applicable to steady-state 
conflicts and great power competition. 
The United States military has become a significant enabler of United States foreign policy, 
covering all spectrums of national power to some degree. Therefore, the United States should 
reframe how it conducts military operations. The narrative should become the main effort, where 
all other actions (overt and covert) are executed to shape the trajectory of the narrative. Major 
General (Ret.) Michael Flynn highlighted in Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence 
Relevant in Afghanistan, that the intelligence community must embrace open-source, population-
centric information as the lifeblood of their analytical work.81 Part of understanding what is 
shaping the operational environment is to incorporate all friendly and enemy acts into a common 
operating picture to understand what and how activities are influencing the area of operations. For 
example, do direct action operations ahead of a conventional clearance enhance conditions for 
stability or counterinsurgency, or do they increase the threat to conventional coalition members? 
 
81 Flynn, Michael Major General (Retired), Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul Batchelor. Fixing Intel. A Blueprint for 
Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, (Center for a New American Security, January 2010). Retrieved from 
https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/AfghanistanMGFlynn_Jan2010.pdf, pg. 23.   
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How are military or interagency actions conditioning the local populace? These types of questions 
drive towards the effectiveness of the operation to reach United States national security objectives. 
Russia and China identify the weak spots, or gray areas, between governmental 
organizations where national law and regulations impose limits that impact cross-agency 
coordination and collaboration. The 2017 NSS identified that “repressive, closed states and 
organizations, although brittle in many ways, are often more agile and faster at integrating 
economic, military, and especially informational means to achieve their goals. They are 
unencumbered by truth, by the rules and protections of privacy inherent in democracies, and by 
the law of armed conflict.”82 Russia’s approach is to utilize the most effective means necessary to 
achieve their stated objective, regardless of ethics or morals they may cross. In the world we live 
in today, this challenges the United States, who, in some ways, is constrained by American values. 
When Russia more freely operates with illicit networks and human rights violators, the United 
States’ ability to influence is diminished. This creates a dilemma for the United States and Western 
allies who are restrained by the very world they built to counter such influence collectively. 
  Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine, with its deployment of "little green men," 
namely, soldiers wearing unmarked uniforms make direct state attribution difficult. Why didn’t 
Crimea respond the way we thought they would or should have when Russia invaded? Because 
Russia was conditioning the area for years. Utilizing the information environment and use of the 
Spetsnaz, shifting the sentiment towards, and any antibodies away, from future Kremlin action. 
Quite like the behavioral conditioning and targeted messaging conducted in Yemen. The idea 
behind the following approach falls in line with reflexive control theory. The intent was to set 
conditions for adversary and civil society perceptions to induce behavior favorable to a future 
 
82 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 27.  
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operation.83 This framework of reflexive control theory, Kasapoglu described previously, is 
aligned with the B/EM model utilized in the Yemen case study. 
Russia and China are ahead of the game when it comes to leveraging industry and the 
private sector for national security objectives. “The United States must prepare for this type of 
competition,” as stated in the 2017 NSS. “China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors 
recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at 
peace” or “at war,” when it is a spectrum of continuous competition.”84 Similar sentiments were 
echoed throughout the interviews with retired senior military officers. Senior political levels of the 
United States government view the conflict spectrum in black and white, but in contrast, United 
States adversaries operate fluidly in the gray zone.85 Heavily influenced by then Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis, the 2018 NDS specifically addressed the need that, “we [US] must 
anticipate how competitors and adversaries will employ new operational concepts and 
technologies to attempt to defeat us, while developing operational concepts to sharpen our 
competitive advantages and enhance our lethality.”86 Reviewing how great powers are shaping 
conflict, and coupled with the United States examples utilizing hybrid capabilities within the 
information environment, can address an organizational concept to “sharpen [this] competitive 
advantage” to operate more fluidly in the gray zone. The following section will identify four 
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Understanding the adversary’s hybrid and information warfare strategy is a critical step in 
designing an organizational framework for the United States to better compete against great 
powers. The United States needs to return to a level of effort like the hybrid and information 
activities conducted during the Cold War. The following recommendations are founded on the 
lessons learned and principles identified in this report—conducting hybrid warfare and leveraging 
the information environment—while in a continuous state of conflict in the gray zone. This 
requires vertical and horizontal organizational efforts to include: a shift in policy, a new 
organizational framework, assigning a lead, and adopting a whole-of-society approach. 
 
1. Create a policy of ambiguity and establish a working group 
Without a coherent policy and corresponding strategic framework, the United States will 
waste time, effort, and money on unrealistic hybrid and information warfare campaigns with little 
to no success. The United States should develop a policy of ambiguity. As in Russia’s case, the 
use of implausible deniability led to the increase use of special forces, creating greater freedom of 
maneuver between secrecy and visibility.87 Implausible deniability allows states to communicate 
resolve, while not escalating crises into open warfare.88  The intent is to generate a situation where 
it is unclear whether a state of war exists, and if it does, who are the aggressors and who are not.  
There is a need to develop an overall coordinated effort. An initial step is to create a Joint 
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to explore in depth an organizational design. The 
JIACG’s charter should review the structural changes that occurred following the 9/11 attack, most 
of which were counterterrorism centric. Examining these changes will identify whether the current 
 
87 Cormac, Grey is the new black. 
88 Cormac, Grey is the new black. 
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organizational design needs revision to be more effective against great power competition. Who 
has oversight, who has accountability and who has the resources to structure such an operational 
entity is the challenge.89 The United States should think about the organization and the respective 
entities in a systems approach that will lead the United States through this transition point and into 
the current conflict space. Future structures must aim at achieving greater speed and effectiveness, 
implementing ways and means to disrupt, counter, and execute hybrid and information warfare 
against great powers to meet the desired ends of the United States.  
Organizational structures should consistently adapt and change for emerging threats. The 
United States can look to its allies for such examples. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense, 
in August 2019, restructured some organizations to confront the evolving threats emerging in cyber 
and information warfare. Their new organization was to provide an asymmetric edge on: 
“intelligence, counter-intelligence, information operations, electronic warfare, cyber and 
unconventional warfare.”90 Joint military commands and the interagency can come together to 
provide a more comprehensive capability to counter threats emanating from great power 
competition. The whole-of-government approach, with its unique authorities and capabilities, 
needs to integrate in a more operational way and to further incorporate all of society. 
 
2. Formalize a Joint Interagency Task Force 
Nation-state competitors, along with other non-state actors, are designing their strategies 
and organizational structures to better leverage the information environment. They are exploiting 
seams in international law and norms and disrupting the post-World War II order developed and 
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led by the United States. These threats span across the interagency and make it difficult for 
thorough analysis and effective responses without the proper integrated targeting and operational 
cells to identify, protect, and counter threats, such as cybercrime, financial crimes, and state-
sponsored illicit activities.91 Establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force is recommended for 
something as strategic as countering Russian or Chinese hybrid and information warfare. This 
requires a national charter to layout the authorities, members, and resource requirements.92 JIATFs 
are a proven organizational framework to help mitigate asymmetric threats. 
JIATFs were extensively used throughout the last two decades in the Global War on Terror. 
They form when a mission requires exceptionally close integration of two or more United States 
government agencies.93 They are also traditionally utilized to increase interagency sharing, but 
they should adapt and change to do more than fuse intelligence and information. Rather, executing 
the authorities and capabilities brought by the whole-of-government. The current JIATF construct 
is not fully operationalized, and it should develop a greater role when executing or countering 
hybrid and information warfare.  
This is likely to meet considerable friction if the chain of command remains structured in 
traditional ways. JIATFs are designed to operate external to the traditional governmental structure, 
and transcend the internal capabilities and authorities of Combatant Commands and Joint Task 
Forces, as stipulated in the Joint Forces Operations and Doctrine publication.94 Historically, 
command and control is assigned to the Secretary of Defense, however, this could shift based on 
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the agreement in a memorandum of understanding and specific mission requirements. The intent 
is to increase cooperation and collaboration across the whole-of-government, and to limit the 
bureaucracy through decentralized authority and responsibility. This would enable a response at 
the speed and scale in which the likes of Russia and China leverage due to their authoritarian 
regimes. The purpose is "to close the gap which now exists between State and Defense at the 
program level and to ensure that our [US] political, propaganda, economic and military efforts are 
properly related to each other."95 Bringing together the instruments of national power at the 
National Security Council level alone is no longer sufficient. Whole-of-Government efforts should 
be pushed down to lower echelons to operationalize the full-spectrum of government capabilities.  
 
3. An organization to initially lead the effort—SOF 
There is currently no United States agency that has the lead conducting hybrid or 
information warfare. Though, there is no single DoD element that can meet all the requirements to 
be effective in conducting hybrid warfare, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), who has 
led many effective JIATF’s with counterterrorism missions, is an acceptable place to start. Dr. 
Michael Vickers, former Under Secretary of Defense of Intelligence, stated, "I want as much 
influence around the world as I can; the main competition [is] where SOF lives." 96 Admiral (Ret.) 
William McRaven, while the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command, 
expressed the idea that “SOF are best used in the tenuous space between diplomacy and 
conventional war.”97 Thus, SOF should play a strategic and operational role in conducting hybrid 
 
95 Bridging the Gap, p. 55 
96 Taft, John, Liz Gormisky and Joe Mariani. Special Operations Forces and Great Power Competition,(Deloitte, 
June 17, 2019). Retrieved from https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/insights/industry/public-sector/future-of-special-
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97 Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last, Force of Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).  
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and information warfare—combined with other instruments of national power to harness unique 
ideas and resources to adapt to the changing nature of warfare. This is not too different than what 
SOF already does around the globe conducting counterterrorism missions. Over the past two 
decades, US SOF have deployed to remote and austere locations, operating with regional partners, 
providing resources, training, technology, and conducting operations that reduce the signature and 
attribution of the United States military. In the hybrid warfare context, these efforts have primarily 
involved the DoD and a few other government agencies, as the action arm overseas, with support 
from the DoS and interagency at large. This organizational framework and relationships within the 
current context could transition to focus on great power competition.  
Deloitte’s research on the future of SOF came to a similar conclusion—use SOF to counter 
hybrid warfare threats. The Deloitte study concluded, “SOF should be given the mandate and 
organic ability to plan and execute joint interagency operations and have a direct link to the 
national-level decision-makers. To accommodate hybrid warfare’s requirements for speed, 
security, and coordination, the future SOF organization should operate dedicated, networked teams 
for interagency coordination and collaboration.”98 Deloitte is describing the construct of a JIATF. 
Assigning the lead to SOCOM, with other governmental agencies aligned in mutually supportive 
roles, could animate modest but effective hybrid and information warfare operations.  
 
4. Enhance Public-Private cooperation and collaboration  
Technology advances at exponential rates, requiring greater coordination with national 
research institutions, as well as the private sector, to build new capabilities for today’s fight. In 
constructing JIATFs, the United States should look outside traditional skill sets to create diverse 
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teams that resemble—not only a whole-of-government—but a whole-of-society. Take the Lower 
Manhattan Security Initiative, for example. This was a partnership between the New York Police 
Department (NYPD), Microsoft, and Manhattan banks to build a surveillance system after 9/11, 
known as the Domain Awareness System.99 It allows the NYPD to track surveillance targets and 
gain detailed information about them. NYPD officers can use this data to inform decision making 
with analytics and operations research. Additionally, it gives them near real-time data to emerging 
threats in the city, enabling a more proactive and timely response to mitigate potential risks. 
Illustrating an example of a whole-of-society approach to counter a complex threat. 
The skill sets and capabilities of a JIATF also need revision—from acquiring people with 
deep cultural experience in conflict areas of interest, to people with PhDs in artificial intelligence, 
data scientists and software engineers. These teams should also incorporate economists and social 
psychologists who are critical to support psychographic analysis and drafting a plan to condition 
behaviors towards the stated objectives. These teams need media experts, from journalists to social 
media influencers. In many ways, the skills and knowledge required are not traditional military 
occupational specialties, but skills that primarily reside in the civilian populace. In closing, World 
War II illustrated to the world what harnessing the United States private sector can do for a war 
effort. It required shifts in policy and new organizational frameworks to pull a whole-of-society 
effort together to defeat adversaries across all domains of conflict.   
 





One of Secretary of Defense Forrestal’s earliest memos to the National Security Council 
in 1948 urged “that our foreign information activities be effectively developed and that they be 
coordinated with the other phases of our foreign and military policies.”100 As it was during and 
following World War II, a whole-of-society approach is still very much needed today. However, 
hybrid warfare and leveraging the information instrument of national power is a lost art within the 
DoD, and in large part, the collective interagency. Seth Jones paints the picture quite clearly:  
“the United States largely abandoned these capabilities following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. After 9/11, the United States focused on lethal, not 
political or information, operations: finding and targeting terrorists and other 
adversaries around the world with sophisticated intelligence and precision-
strike capabilities. Yet these lethal capabilities are of limited value against 
adversaries who are fighting primarily with information and 
disinformation.”101  
To harness the full spectrum of United States national powers will require the level of 
collaboration, coordination, and integration across governmental agencies, and even the private 
sector, that followed 9/11.To paraphrase Frank Steder in his CTX article, the hybrid approach, 
when viewed through the lens of Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz and Chinese strategist 
Sun Tzu, as simply, warfare that uses all means necessary to achieve victory.102  
 
100 Inboden, William. Reforming American Power: Civilian National Security Institutions in the Early Cold War 
and Beyond (2016) in Sustainable Security: Rethinking American National Security Strategy. Oxford University 
Press, 149. 
101 Jones, Seth. Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare, (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, October 1, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-
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It took the collapse of the Twin Towers to make the necessary structural changes in the 
United States government—after only 19 terrorists found the seams to exploit vulnerabilities in an 
open and free society. It is the same vulnerabilities that great power competition attempts to 
disrupt. Policy and organizational changes lagged until it was too late, and then fundamentally 
changed the United States national security structure—hyper focused on the Global War on Terror. 
A new threat is clear and present, and so the United States should not wait for another tower to 
collapse, an election to be meddled with, or facts of a pandemic to be revised, before implementing 
the necessary changes to begin countering these asymmetric threats.  
The research throughout this paper tells a very complex story, and the extreme efforts 
United States adversaries will attempt to shift global power. It is also a fresh reminder that war is 
fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor, and it is in the interest of all, that every effort be 
made to subdue the enemy before fighting. Due to the changing nature of conflict and advances in 
information technologies, shifts in authorities and foreign policies are required to align the 
intelligence community, United States government departments and agencies, and even the private 
sector in a more effective way. Conducting hybrid warfare and shaping the information 
environment are the new norms that the United States must contend with to prevent needless war 
and continue to lead the global liberal order. Even the current Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Army General Mark Milley, recognizes the need for the United States to improve its non-
kinetic capabilities.103 There have been too many conferences and discussion panels on admiring 
the problem—it is time to move past discussions and start organizing.  
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